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The President's message to Congress on February 5th was
not simply a proposal to enlarge the Supreme Court as some
of the newspaper headlines implied. It recommended legisla-
tion to accomplish four purposes: (i) the appointment of addi-
tional judges in all federal courts, including the Supreme
Court of the United States; (2) the temporary assignment of
circuit and district judges to relieve congested dockets in the
trial courts; (3) assistance to the Supreme Court in supervising
the conduct of business in the lower courts by the appointment
of a Proctor; and (4) permitting direct and immediate appeals
from the district courts to the Supreme Court in cases in which
the trial court determines a question of constitutionality of an
act of Congress.'
The federal system of courts consists of the Supreme Court,
Circuit Courts of Appeals, District Courts, and some special
courts in Washington, e.g., the Court of Customs and Patent
Appeals, the Customs Court, and the Court of Claims. There
is one Circuit Court of Appeals with three or more judges for
each of the ten circuits into which the country is divided. Each
circuit consists of several districts, there being 85 districts
altogether. Some districts cover an entire state; others, a part
::Assistant Professor of Law, Ohio State University.
U. S. Lav., Week, Feb. 9, 1937. (Vol. 4 , Index 669).
125
126 LAW JOURNAL-MARCH, 1937
of a state. The more populous districts are subdivided into
divisions with one or more district judges in each division.
The report of the last conference of Senior Circuit Judges
which met in October, 1936, stated that in 5i out of a total of
85 judicial districts the business of the district courts is current.
In 34 or more than one-third the dockets are in a state which
requires delay for the trial of cases at issue.2 In such a state of
affairs, with more than one-third the districts behind their
dockets, it seems to be the plainest kind of common sense to
utilize, wherever possible, the services of judges whose dockets
are cleared, and such mobile judges as may be appointed if this
legislation is adopted. This is largely an acceptance for the
federal system of a scheme which has been in effect in Ohio
for many years. Without it the Cuyahoga County Court of
Appeals and Common Pleas Court would have been much
further behind their dockets than is the case, or the number
of judges elected in the county would have been doubled, or
nearly so.
The creation of the position of Proctor for the Supreme
Court is merely a device to make this scheme for assigning
circuit and district judges function efficiently. The proposal for
direct appeals from districts courts to the Supreme Court is
merely an extension of the rule which now permits such direct
appeals from the statutory three judge courts. These are sped-
ally assembled district courts called together to determine cer-
tain questions under the Anti-Trust3 and Interstate Commerce
Laws4 and applications for temporary or interlocutory injunc-
tions against the enforcement of state statutes, or administrative
orders claimed to violate the federal constitution.' A bill ex-
tending the direct appeal from district court orders prohibiting
compliance with federal laws was considered by the last Con-
gress. Chief Justice Hughes and Justices Van Devanter and
2 U. S. Law Week, Feb. 9, 1937, P. z (Vol. 4, Index 670).
3 15 U.S.C.A. sec. z8, 29.
4 49 U.S.C.A. sec. 44, 45.
Gz8 U.S.C.A. sec. 380.
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Brandeis appeared before the Judiciary Committee of the
Senate at the invitation of the chairman. The Chief Justice
expressed the opinion that the bill was unnecessary because
the Supreme Court, under existing law, could bring up any such
case on certiorari in advance of decision by the Circuit Court of
Appeals, and cited cases in which it had been done.' He might,
also, have cited many more cases in which it has not been done
with the result that months or years of delay have taken place.
The T.V.A.7 and Duke Power Company' cases are two which
suggest themselves as examples of the long and expensive de-
lays made necessary by the present procedure. Two objections
made by the Chief Justice to the bill then under consideration
could easily be eliminated in carrying out the President's pro-
posals. One of the objections to the former bill was that only
a preliminary matter would be involved in the appeal to the
Supreme Court. The present proposal calls for a direct and
immediate appeal on the merits with precedence over all mat-
ters pending in the Supreme Court. This would also remove
a second objection to the former bill-that it would increase the
number of cases in which the court would be required to grant
or deny review. It is to be presumed that the President con-
templates a law which will save the Court that trouble and
require a consideration on the merits of the appeal. As a part
of this proposal it is suggested that no decision or injunction
be issued on a constitutional question without previous and
ample notice to the Attorney General and an opportunity for
the United States to present evidence and be heard. This again
seems to be entirely reasonable. For the machinery of govern-
ment to be stalled by an injunction issued without notice to its
chief law officer seems an unwarranted failure to recognize the
coordinate character of the other two branches of government.
U. S. Law Week, Feb. 9, 1937, P. 2 (Vol. 4, Index 670).
Ashwander v. Tenznessee Valley Authority, 297 U. S. 341, 56 Sup. Ct.
466 (1936).
1 Greenwood Co. S. C. v. Duke Power Co. (C.C.A. 4 th Cir.) 81 F. (?d)
986, In Supreme Ct. 8I L.Ed. 149, 57 S. Ct. 202 (1936).
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To permit cases, which may decide large questions of policy
and power, to get off to a bad start, which later handicaps the
government, seems useless and improper. One of the most
respected members of our faculty has performed a service in
pointing out the necessity of having a proper record of facts
in constitutional cases.9 Time after time such cases have been
disposed of, in a certain way, because of defects in the record.
Giving the government a fair chance to avoid such an unfor-
tunate result is only practical justice.
The specific provision for additional judges is as follows:
"Sec. i. (a) When any judge of a court of the United States,
appointed to hold his office during good behavior, has hereto-
fore or hereafter attained the age of seventy years and has held
a commission or commissions as judge of any such court or
courts at least iO years, continuously or otherwise, and within
six months thereafter has neither resigned nor retired, the
President, for each such judge who has not so resigned or re-
tired, shall nominate, and by and with the advice and consent
of the Senate, shall appoint one additional judge to the court
to which the former is commissioned.
"Provided, That no additional judge shall be appointed
hereunder if the judge who is of retirement age dies, resigns,
or retires prior to the nomination of such additional judge.
"(b) The number of judges of any court shall be perma-
nently increased by the number appointed thereto under the
provisions of subsection (a) of this section. No more than fifty
judges shall be appointed thereunder, nor shall any judge be
so appointed if such appointment would result in
"(i) more than fifteen members of the Supreme Court of
the United States,
"(2) more than two additional members so appointed to
the circuit court of appeals, the Court of Claims, the United
'Professor C. D. Laylin, unpublished paper read at legal institutes at
St. Clairsville and Canton.
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States Court of Customs and Patent Appeals, or the Customs
Court, or
"(3) more than twice the number of judges now authorized
to be appointed for any district, or in the case of judges ap-
pointed for more than one district, for any such group of
districts.
"(c) That number of judges which is at least two-thirds of
the number of which the Supreme Court of the United States
consists, or three-fifths of the number of which the United
States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, the Court
of Claims, or the United States Court of Customs and Patent
Appeals consists, shall constitute a quorum of such court.
"(d) An additional judge shall not be appointed under the
provisions of this section when the judge who is of retirement
age is commissioned to an office as to which Congress has pro-
vided that a vacancy shall not be filled."
It would seem that there is no real objection to this pro-
posal in so far as the lower courts are concerned. As has been
indicated, many of these courts are behind their dockets."0
Where judges eligible to retire by reason of reaching seventy
years and having served io years or more do not care to retire
at full pay or resign, additional judges are to be appointed.
One can well believe that such a plan would give us a more
efficient administration of justice in the lower courts. To a
certain extent it is susceptible of the charge of "packing," which
is used particularly with reference to the Supreme Court. It
is unquestionably an advantage to the government to win law-
suits in the lower courts, even if an appeal to the Supreme
Court is necessary. This proposal for additional district and
circuit judges to supplement and possibly, in effect, to cancel
the older judges who have been on the bench for many years,
would probably improve the chance of favorable court action
10 This is true of both the Circuit Court of Appeals of the Sixth Circuit
and the District Court for the Southern District of Ohio.
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on congressional legislation. The effect in that direction is not
sufficiently obvious and inevitable that it needs to be viewed
with alarm.
Adding Supreme Court Justices is one of many suggestions
for dealing with the problem of judicial supremacy. Before
any progress can be made in discussing such a proposal a pre-
liminary question must be asked and answered: Is any tamper-
ing with the present balance of power desirable? There are
many people who sincerely hold the view that the power now
lodged in the Supreme Court is not too great and that the
Court as now constituted is well suited to exercise such power.
It is undoubtedly true that many of those who object most
vehemently to any proposal to tamper with the Supreme Court
are actuated by motives of self interest or of party politics.
These gentlemen piously, and many others sincerely, declare
that we live under a government of laws and not of men, and
that the Supreme Court must be supreme. If much repeating
makes a thing so, then it is true that we have a government
of laws and not of men. However, there are many who regard
the statement as a catch phrase which has had little significance
since 178oa when it was incorporated into the Massachusetts
constitution. The words of the present Chief Justice of the
United States Supreme Court spoken when he was Governor
of New York express the truth in a straight-forward language:
"We are under a Constitution, but the Constitution is what the
judges say it is." Mr. Justice Stone, in his dissenting opinion
in the A. A. A. Case uttered a statement which expresses the
same idea in other words. He said, "The power of courts to
declare a statute unconstitutional is subject to two guiding
principles of decision which ought never to be absent from
judicial consciousness. One is that courts are concerned only
with the power to enact statutes, not with their wisdom. The
other is that, while unconstitutional exercise of power by the
executive and legislative branches of the government is subject
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to judicial restraint, the only check upon our own exercise of
power is our own sense of self-restraint.""
Those who take issue with these pronouncements by the
two honored members of the Supreme Court will have diffi-
culty accounting for the many reversals of position which will
be found in the record of any court of last resort. When the
Legal Tender cases were decided, the first one holding the
Legal Tender Act of Civil War days unconstitutional by a
4 to 3 decision,' 2 and the second, a short time later, holding the
same act constitutional by a 5 to 4 decision," was it the Consti-
tution speaking, or some very human men? The question as to
whether President Grant packed the Supreme Court to cause
this reversal has never been satisfactorily answered. It is a fact
that two additional judges were appointed by him on the very
day that the first decision was announced. It is also a fact that
these two Justices Strong and Bradley voted with the former
minority to make a new majority of 5- It is claimed that this
was a pure coincidence and it may well have been.'" Be that as
it may, it is difficult, in view of such an occurrence, to preserve
the childlike faith in the inexorability of constitutional law and
its remoteness from the thoughts and desires of the men who
pronounce it.
In the Ohio Supreme Court Reports there are many in-
stances of the overruling of earlier cases upon the faith of which
men had acted. In a recent case having to do with the men-
tioning of insurance in the voir dire examination of jurors in
automobile accident cases, the Chief Justice concurred with the
majority of the Court "with the regret that by this decision
this court reverses its position on this highly controversial ques-
tion for the second time within the brief period of approxi-
"United States v. Butler, 297 U. S. i, 56 Sup. Ct. 312, 8o L. Ed. 477
(936).
12 Hepburn v. Griswold, 8 Wall. 603 (U.S.), 19 L. Ed. 513 (1869).
"' Legal Tender Cases, 79 U. S. 457, zo L. Ed. 287 (1870).
" Warren, The Supreme Court in United States History, Vol. 3, P. 239.
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mately a year and a half."'" How is this accounted for? Simply
by the fact that changes in the personnel of the Court bring
about changes in the belief as to what the law is or should be.
How else could it be with honest self-respecting men placed in
a position in which they are required to deal out justice as they
see it?
However, it does not. follow that, because one shares the
view that the Supreme Court has the power to impose its own
views of social and economic matters upon the country, the
President's proposal will be accepted as the most desirable step
to take. One may be entirely satisfied to admit frankly that
the majority of the nine members holds the power of staying
reform and be quite willing to allow the power to remain just
there. Again, one may feel that the power is not fortunately
so placed and yet disapprove of the President's method of re-
moving it. There are 25 or 30 proposed bills now pending in
Congress, each attempting to deal with this problem in a fash-
ion somewhat different from the others. Such proposals have
run the gamut from depriving the Supreme Court of all power
to declare federal laws unconstitutional, to the President's
measure, which, it is submitted, is the mildest and least revo-
lutionary of the entire lot.
It is not the first time that unpopular decisions by the
Supreme Court have caused a clamor for some means of curb-
ing the power of the Court. In our own time it is easily re-
called how urgently Theodore Roosevelt advocated a reform
in this direction. It is probable that many eminent members
of his party shared his enthusiasm for such a proposal. He
appeared before the Ohio Constitutional Convention of 1912
and gave the members the benefit of his views upon reforms in
government. After discussing the recall of judges as a last
resort and preferable to impeachment he proceeded as follows:
"Therefore, we should be cautious about recalling the judge,
"5 Dowd-Feder, Inc. v. Truesdell, 130 Ohio St. 530, 536, 200 N.E. 762,
765 (1936).
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and we should be cautious about interfering in any way with
the judge in decisions which he makes in the ordinary course
as between individuals. But when a judge decides a constitu-
tional question, when he decides what the people as a whole
can or cannot do, the people should have the right to recall
that decision-not the judge-if they think it wrong. We
should hold the judiciary in all respect; but it is both absurd
and degrading to make a fetish of a judge or of anyone else.
Abraham Lincoln said in his first inaugural: 'If the policy of
the government upon vital questions affecting the whole people
is to be irrevocably fixed by decisions of the Supreme Court,
* * * the people will have ceased to be their own rulers,
having to that extent practically resigned their government
into the hands of that eminent tribunal. Nor is there in this
view any assault upon the courts or judges.' Lincoln actually
applied in successful fashion the principle of the recall in the
Dred Scott Case. He denounced the Supreme Court for that
iniquitous decision in language much stronger than I have ever
used in criticizing any court, and appealed to the people to
recall that decision-the word 'recall' in this connection was
not then known, but the phrase exactly describes what he advo-
cated. He was successful, the people took his view, and the
decision was practically recalled.""6
The convention wrote into the Ohio constitution the fol-
lowing provision: "No law shall be held unconstitutional and
void by the Supreme Court without the concurrence of at least
all but one of the judges, except in affirmance of a judgment
of the Court of Appeals declaring a law unconstitutional and
void."' 7 It is somewhat surprising to discover how little oppo-
sition there was in the convention to this proposal when made.
It was originally proposed to require the unanimous concur-
rence of the seven members of the court before a law could be
held unconstitutional. The present form was as far as the
"6 Proceedings and Debates, Ohio Constitutional Convention, 191 z, Vol.
I, p. 383.
17 Article IV, sec. z.
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convention could be moved in compromise and there has been
little criticism of the measure from the viewpoint of encroach-
ment upon judicial power in the twenty-four years of its
existence."8
This form of curb upon the power of the United States
Supreme Court has been frequently suggested. It is possible
that the power given by the constitution to Congress in con-
nection with the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court
is broad enough to permit Congress to require more than a
majority of the court to concur before a law should be declared
unconstitutional. This provision is found in Art. III, Sec. 2:
"In all other Cases before mentioned, the Supreme Court shall
have appellate jurisdiction, both as to Law and Fact, with such
Exceptions, and under such Regulations as the Congress shall
make." Perhaps this would permit such a change as just sug-
gested, or another which more closely resembles the recall
advocated by Theodore Roosevelt, namely, that any law de-
clared unconstitutional by the Supreme Court, if passed again
by both houses of Congress with a two-thirds vote in each, shall
be put into effect and regarded as valid.
It is unquestionably within the power of the Supreme Court
to declare unconstitutional any law such as either of these just
mentioned" and, if this were done, the only recourse to make
them operative would be by way of Constitutional amendment.
Those good folks who urge that any change should be accom-
plished only through amendment of the Constitution are either
unaware, or all too conscious, of the almost total impossibility
of accomplishing reform by that means on a question where
partisan politics will play a part. Witness the history of the
Child Labor Amendment, which has never been made a strictly
party issue and yet seems almost hopeless of adoption; thirteen
years of effort and still eight states short of the goal.20
18 The provision has been criticized for other reasons. See Board of Edu-
cation v. Columbus, 1I8 Ohio St. 295, I6o N.E. 902 (I928).
"o Hughes, "The Supreme Court of the United States," p. 241.
20 The newspapers have recently carried the announcement that the Texas
legislature has refused to ratify the amendment.
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As one reviews the foregoing suggestions for curbing the
power of the Supreme Court, (i) depriving it of all power to
declare federal laws unconstitutional; (2) requiring more than
a majority to concur in such a declaration; (3) referendum by
the people or by the Congress to override the Judicial veto, it
seems that one is forced to conclude that the President's pro-
posal is the mildest of all. He would make it possible for the
justices to retire at full pay at seventy and after ten years -or
more of service. He would have enacted the measure which
was passed by the House in 1869, and eliminated from the
Retirement Law in the Senate, which would make possible
whenever any federal judge refused to retire at seventy to
appoint an additional judge to assist in the work.
The six justices who are more than seventy at the present
time are not all to be found on the side opposing the President's
program of reform legislation. The oldest, Mr. Justice Bran-
deis, is as much a supporter of the New Deal as are his younger
colleagues,"' Justices Stone and Cardozo. The Chief Justice
has not been unwavering in his opposition to this legislation
and, in fact, has supported several of the laws.2 These two, as
well as the four justices who may be fairly labeled as conserva-
tives, are subject to the application of the proposed bill. Should
the six choose to remain rather than to retire, the President
might appoint six others to bring the total to fifteen. No present
member of the House or Senate would be eligible for such an
appointment. 3 No man worthy of occupying a place on this,
the most highly esteemed judicial body in the world, would
commit himself in advance to decide any future case in a cer-
tain way.
Even if six men could be found whose past acts and utter-
ances seem to commit them to a certain line of conduct, it does
not follow that the legislation yet to be passed on will have
any easier course through the judicial shoals than some of the
21 See Table 3-
22 See Table 3.
21 United States Constitution, Art. I, sec. 6.
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most cherished of the past. Another N.R.A. might muster the
support of the six new justices, but it must not be forgotten that
the execution 6f the old N.R.A. in the "Sick Chicken Case"2'
was the joint effort of the nine. It is quite reasonable to sup-
pose that the nine, or possible eight, would join again to kill
off a successor piece of legislation.
If Mr. Justice Brandeis, the oldest of the six, should be the
only one to retire, a successor to fill his place as a judicial states-
man of the very highest rank would be extremely hard to find.
Should the Court, as then constituted of fourteen members, be
asked to review the judgment of an inferior court holding a
law unconstitutional, a majority of eight would be necessary to
reverse and uphold the law.2" It is by no means certain that
three of the present members and five new appointees could be
counted upon to favor the law.
By the mere force of adventitious circumstances President
Harding, in his short term of two years, was permitted to
appoint four members of the court. Two of them, Justices
Sutherland and Butler, are among the conservatives who have
passed the age of seventy. The others, Justice Sanford and
former President Taft, appointed Chief Justice, were also
fairly consistent conservatives."s If it were not somewhat sancti-
fied and privileged by being published in a judicial opinion in
the regular reports of the Federal Courts, one would hesitate
to mention a little bit of Supreme Court gossip. District Judge
Bourquin, until recently a federal judge in Montana, in the
course of an opinion reported in 52 Fed. 2nd Series, 196, makes
the following statement: "It is said * * * that Chief Justice
Taft declared that 'At a conference I announced I have been
appointed to reverse a few decisions, and,' with his famous
chuckle, 'I looked right at old man Holmes when I said it.'
24 Schecter Poultry Corp. v. U. S., 295 U. S. 495, 79 L. Ed. 1570, 55
Sup. Ct. 837 (1935).
25 Hughes, op. cit., p. 6o.
2 Bates "Story of the Supreme Court," pp. z6z, 263, z78, z8o, 287.
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What a pity were these illuminating incidents lost to history
save in so far as the Court's reports will verify them."
No one would insist that the retirement age provided in
the proposed law is the only one which could have been selected.
If one were to squarely face the issue and make the test that
of open-mindedness upon the validity of such legislation as
has been before the court during the past four years, Table 3
makes a good showing for the age selected by the President.
Upon this point the language of the present Chief Justice is of
interest: "It is extraordinary how reluctant aged justices are to
retire and to give up their accustomed work. They seem to be
tenacious of the appearance of adequacy." * * * Under pres-
ent conditions of living, and in view of the increased facility of
maintaining health and vigor, the age of seventy may well be
thought too early for compulsory retirement. Such retirement
is too often the community's loss. A compulsory retirement
at seventy-five could more easily be defended. I agree that the
importance in the Supreme Court of avoiding the risk of having
judges who are unable properly to do their work and yet insist
upon remaining upon the bench, is too great to permit chances
to be taken, and any age selected must be somewhat arbitrary,
as the time of the failing in mental powers differs widely."2
But it must not be forgotten that the President's proposal is
not one of compulsory retirement, but rather, one of decreasing
the proportion in the vote of the court of the justices over
seventy.
It seems that if by mere force of circumstances President
Harding should be allowed to appoint four conservatives to the
court to make it more certain that Justices Holmes and Brandeis
should be confined to the state of dissenters, it is not too much
for a reform President to ask that during his two terms he be
27 At no time since the Civil War has either the average or median tenure
of the Judges of the Supreme Court been as great as it is today. Today the
average tenure is 15% years, the median tenure 15 years.
2s Hughes, op. cit., 75, 76.
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allowed to name at least six members to a court that may
number fifteen. 9
If as many as six of the present members of the court had
retired or left the bench for any reason, the President would
have filled their places. The most bitter of his opponents
would not have questioned his right to appoint as their succes-
sors men in whom he and the majority of the Senate had con-
fidence, and whose attitude on broad questions of social policy
were similar to those of the President. Had this power come
into the President's hands fortuitously he would have exercised
it, just as did President Harding and all other Presidents who
have had the opportunity."0
It is not a questionable view of the essence of our scheme of
democratic government that a course of procedure which would
be taken for granted, if chance had made it necessary, is to be
severely condemned if brought about by action of the people's
elected representatives? It must be always borne in mind that
there is no shred of constitutional objection to the Congress and
the 'President doing that which he proposes.
This proposal does not insure a result in which the Admin-
istration's laws will be given a rubber stamp of approval. It
cannot be supposed that the President does not realize that he
will not be able to dominate the Supreme Court.3' Those who
29 This is upon the assumption that none of the present justices would
leave the bench during his administration. If any should do so, the number of
appointees would be thereby increased. To prevent the number of justices
from being permanently fixed at 15, the following might be enacted as a part
of the proposed law. In lieu of the first sentence of sec. i (b): "When an
additional judge has been appointed hereunder by reason of the non-retirement
of a judge eligible to retire, or his failure to resign, no vacancy shall be deemed
to exist upon the subsequent retirement, resignation, or death of the latter."
"Thereunder" in the second sentence would be changed to "under subsec-
tion a."
30 Three Presidents, Jackson, Lincoln, and Taft were able to appoint a
controlling number of the members of the court. See Hughes, "The Supreme
Court of the United States," p. 43.
31Warren, "The Supreme Court in United States History," Vol. i, p.
22, "Nothing is more striking in the history of the Court than the manner in
which the hopes of those who expected a judge to follow the political views of
the President appointing him have been disappointed."
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suggest that he would appoint men who would merely carry
out his desires do him a grave injustice. There has been no
criticism of the members of the Supreme Court from any source
which is so unfair as is this reflection upon the President. The
liberal justices now on the court have amply demonstrated their
independence. It is to be expected that new appointees will be
of a caliber which would make the same course probable. If
the President should endeavor, which the writer does not expect
him to do, to appoint persons as to whose integrity, inde-
pendence and capability there is question, the Senate should,
and probably would, refuse to confirm the appointments. If,
within the constitution, and hence without an amendment, a
plan can be put into effect which gives the President and Con-
gress a slightly better chance of working out a program of social
betterment, who can say, "It shall not be done."? With an
unmistakable mandate from the people the Chief Executive and
the Legislative branch are set to go. Here is a proposal to instill
a small amount of new blood into the Judiciary in the hope
that thereby more sympathy for the people's wishes may be
engendered. It will take more by way of argument than epi-
thets such as "Dictator," "Court Packer," "Destroyer of the
Constitution," etc., to convince many that this mild experiment
in governmental reform should not be tried.
APPENDIX
JUSTICES OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
Source: Congressional Directory, January 1936, pp. 383-386. Compiled by
Prof. W. M. Duflus, College of Commerce and Administration, Ohio State University
1. CHARLES EVANs HUGHES, Chief Justice. Age 74; will be 75 April 1I,
1937. Elected Governor of New York for two terms (1907-08 and i9o9-
1o); resigned October 6, 191o, appointed Associate Justice, United States
Supreme Court [by President Taft] May z, i91o, and assumed duties
October io, i91o; nominated for President of the United States by the
Republican National Convention June 1O, 1916, and resigned from the
Supreme Court on the same day; appointed Secretary of State [by President
Harding] March 5, i921, resigned March 5, 1925, and resumed practice
in New York. Member of Permanent Court of Arbitration, The Hague,
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1926-1930; Judge of Permanent Court of International Justice, 1928-
1930; appointed by President Hoover as Chief Justice of the United
States February 3, 1930, confirmed by the Senate February 13, 193o, and
took his seat February 24, 193o. Author of (among other books) The
Supreme Court of the United States (Columbia University Lectures),
1927.
2. WILLIS VAN DEVANTER, of Cheyenne, Wyoming, Associate Justice. Age
77; will be 78 April 17, 1937. Born in Marion, Indiana. Delegate to
Republican National Convention and member Republican National Com-
mittee in x896; appointed Assistant Attorney-General of the United States
by President McKinley in 1897, being assigned to the Department of the
Interior; appointed United States circuit judge, eighth circuit, by President
Roosevelt in 1903; appointed Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of
the United States by President Taft December 16, 191o, and entered upon
the duties of that office January 3 following.
3- JAMES CLARK McREYNOLDs, Associate Justice. Age 75. February 3,
1937. Born Elkton, Kentucky; practiced law at Nashville, Tennessee;
Assistant Attorney-General of the United States 1903-1907; thereafter
removed to New York; appointed [by President Wilson] Attorney-General
of the United States, March 5, 1913, and Associate Justice of the Supreme
Court of the United States August 29, 1914; took his seat October Iz,
1914.
4. Louis DEMBiTZ BRANDEIS, Associate Justice. Age 8o; will be 8I Novem-
ber 13, 1937. Born Louisville, Kentucky; began practice of law in St.
Louis, Missouri, 1878; removed to Boston, Massachusetts in 1879 and prac-
ticed law there until June 1916. Nominated an Associate Justice of the
Supreme Court of the United States by President Wilson on January 28,
1916; confirmed by the Senate June I, i916, and took his seat June 5,
1916.
5. GEORGE SUTHERLAND, of Salt Lake City, Associate Justice. Age 74, will
be 75 March 25, 1937. Born in England; admitted to the practice of
law in the supreme court of Michigan in 1883; thereafter followed the
practice of law until his appointment as a member of the Supreme Court
of the United States; member of the 57 th Congress from Utah; elected
to the United States Senate by the Utah Legislature for the term beginning
March 4, 1905, and reelected in 1911. President American Bar Associa-
tion, 1916- 17. Author of Constitutional Power and World Affairs (Colum-
bia University lectures) 1918. Nominated an Associate Justice of the
Supreme Court by President Harding, September 5, ixzz, immediately
confirmed by the Senate, and entered upon the duties of the office October
2, 1922.
6. PIERCE BUTLER, Associate Justice. Age 70, will be 71 March 17, 1937.
Born Waterford, Minnesota; admitted to the bar at St. Paul in I888 and
practiced law there until January 1923. Nominated an Associate Member
of the Supreme Court of the United States by President Harding Novem-
ber 23, 1922, confirmed by the Senate December 21, 1922, and took his
seat January 2, 1923.
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7. HARLAN F. STONE, of New York City, Associate Justice. Age 64, will be
65 October i1, 1937. Born Chesterfield, New Hampshire; admitted to
New York bar 1898; while practicing law lectured on law in Columbia
Law School 1899-i9oz; 1910-1923; Kent professor of law and dean of
Columbia Law School, 1910-I923; resigned 1923 and became member of
a law firm. Appointed Attorney-General of the United States [by Presi-
dent Coolidge] April 7, 1924; nominated Associate Justice of the Supreme
Court of the United States by President Coolidge January 5, 1925; con-
firmed by the Senate February 5, I9z5, and entered upon the duties of
that office March 2, 1925.
8. OWEN J. ROBERTS, of West Vincent Township, Chester County, Pennsyl-
vania. Age 61, will be 6z May 2, 1937. Born in Philadelphia; began
practice there in 1898 and continuously practiced there until June 1930.
Fellow, instructor, assistant professor, and professor of law at the University
of Pennsylvania, 1898-1918. Director Equitable Life Assurance Society of
the United States, Franklin Fire Insurance Company of Philadelphia, Real
Estate-Land Title and Trust Company of Philadelphia, Bell Telephone
Company of Pennsylvania, and American Telephone and Telegraph Com-
pany; member Council of American Law Institute. Appointed by Presi-
dent Coolidge one of two attorneys to prosecute cases arising under leases
of Government lands in California and Wyoming, in 1924; nominated
Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States by President
Hoover May 9, 1930; confirmed by the Senate May 2o, 193o, and entered
upon the duties of that office June 2, 1930.
9. BENJAIIN N. CARDOZO, Associate Justice. Age 66, will be 67 May 24,
1937. Born at New York City; admitted to the bar, x891; elected Justice
of the Supreme Court of New York for term beginning January I, 1914;
designated by the Governor to act as Associate Judge of the Court of Ap-
peals of New York, February 2, 1914; elected Associate Judge of the
Court of Appeals for term beginning January I, 1918; elected Chief Judge
of the Court of Appeals for term beginning January I, 1927; resigned as
Chief Judge, March 7, 1932, having been nominated by President Hoover
February 15, 1932, as an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the
United States, and confirmed by the Senate, February Z4, 193z; entered
upon the duties of that office March 14, 1932; vice-president of the Amer-
ican Law Institute, 1923-193z. Author of (among other books) The
Nature of the Judicial Process (Yale University lectures), 192i, The
Growth of the Law (Yale University lectures), 1924; the Paradoxes of
Legal Science (Columbia University lectures), I928; Law and Literature,
and other essays and addresses, 1930.
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TABLE I.-JUSTICES OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
FEBRUARY 5, 1937
Summary Statement: Political Affiliation; Appointing President; Date of Appointment;
Length of Service; Age when Appointed; Present Age.
bn~ c2 , to
justices .. . .
00 0
0.k. 92 0 , t*
__ __4_ _ .14 . ~ . 13
I. Hughes .......... Rep. Hoover Feb. 3,1930 7 yearse 67 74-
z. Van Devanter ..... Rep. Taft Dec. 16, x91o z6 years, a month 5I 77
3. McReynolds ....... Dem. Wilson Aug. 29, 1914 22 years, 4 months 52 75
4. Brandeis .......... Dem. Wilson Jan. 28, 1916 20 years, 8 months 59 80
S. Sutherland ........ Rep. Harding Sept. 5, x9zz x4years, 4 months 6o 74
6. Butler ........... Dem. Harding Nov. 23, 5922 14years, x month 96 70
7- Stone ............ Rep. Coolidge Jan. S, igzg as years, xY months 5z 64.
S. Roberts .......... Rep. Hoover May 9, 193o 6 years, 7 months 5s 6x
9. Cardozo ......... Dem. Hoover Feb. 1S, 1932 4 years, x months 6z 66
1 Five Republicans, four Democrats.
2 Since entrance upon duties of the office, not since date of appointment. In some
cases the difference in time is due to delay in confirmation of the appointment by the Sen-
ate. Mr. Brandeis was nominated January 28, 19x6, was confirmed by the Senate after
four months deliberation, on June I, 19x6, and took his seat June 5, x915.
8 Age at last birthday before appointment.
'Age at last birthday.
r As Chief Justice ; 6 years,! month as Associate Justice.
Source: Tables I, 2, and 3 were compiled by Prof. W. M. Duffus, College of Com-
merce and Administration, Ohio State University, from the Congressional Directory,
January 1936, Who's Who in America, 1934-1935, The New Republic, December 6, 5922,
p. 27 (for the political affiliation of Justice Butler), The Traffic World, February 20, 1932,
p. 385 (for the political affiliation of Justice Cardozo).
TABLE 2.-JUSTICES OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
FEBRUARY 5, 1937
Summary of Appointments by Presidents of the United States,
December 16, igio-February 5, 1937
President Number of Names of JusticesJustices
Taft .................... I Van Devanter
Wilson .................. . McReynolds, Brandeis
Harding ................. 2 Sutherland, Butler
Coolidge ................. I Stone
Hoover .................. 3 Hughes, Roberts, Cardozo
Roosevelt .................. 0
Source: Table I.
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(SUPPLEMENT TO TABLE 3)
CITATION OF CASES LISTED IN TABLE 3
a. "Hot Oil"-Panama Refining v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388 (Decided Jan. 7, 1935).
2. Gold Clause-Norman v. Baltimore & 0. Ry. Co., 294 U.S. 240 (Decided Feb. 18,
1935).
3. Railroad Retirement-Railroad Retirement Board v. Alton R. Co., 295 U.S. 330 (De-
cided May 6, 1935).
4. N.R.A.-Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (Decided May 27,
1935).
5- Farm Moratorium-Louisville Joint Stock Land Bank v. Radford, 295 U.S. 555 (De-
cided May 27, 1935).
6. A.A.A-United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. I (Decided Jan. 6, 1936).
7. T.V.A. Power-Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 297 U.S. 288 (Decided
Feb. 17, 1936).
8. Guffey Coal Act-Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (Decided May aS, 1936).
9. New York Minimum Wage Act-Morehead v. New York$ ex. rel. Tipaldo, z98 U.S.
587 (Decided June 1, 1936).
REASON FOR SELECTION OF CASES LisTED IN TABLE 3
There is disagreement as to the number of cases which register the individual opin-
ions of the justices of the Supreme Court.on issues which were raised by the Roosevelt
administration and which would not have been raised by the Hoover administration if it
had been continued in power on March 4, 1933. Fourteen and even sixteen cases, including
two decided in January, 1937, have been cited by journalists as proper tests of the re-
sponsiveness of the Supreme Court to New Deal policies which are distinctively New Deal.
The compiler of Table 3 does not believe that all of the fourteen or sixteen cases referred
to should be included in the "box score" but he would be pleased to see the results of any
scoring that anyone else has the time and the judgment to make. Table 3 is submitted as a
representative sample of decisions on fundamental issues between conservatives and liberals.
